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100 years ago Einstein discovered E = mc2, the secret energy stored in ordinary mass. ∆H =
D(H − H) is the chemical energy released in chemical bond formation between two H atoms.
The failure to recognize the enormously different energy scales in those two equations reflected in
current events may start a chain reaction this very year, on the one-hundredths anniversary of
Einstein’s discovery, that leads to the end of civilization. Due to the confluence of a particular set
of circumstances, this particular moment is more dangerous than any other in the history of nuclear
weapons. Physicists have a special responsibility to do their utmost to prevent this from happening.
This paper is a call to arms. A principle to underpin nuclear non-proliferation and enhance stability
is advocated.
PACS numbers:
I. EINSTEIN’S LEGACY
100 years ago, on September 27, 1905, A. Einstein
wrote “It is not impossible that with bodies whose
energy-content is variable to a high degree (e.g. with
radium salts) the theory may be successfully put to the
test”, in connection with the equation E = mc2 that he
had just discovered[1] . Today, Einstein is revered by
scientists as well as the world at large as the greatest sci-
entist of all times, and this full year has been dedicated to
honor him and his momentous contributions. Yet there is
an imminent danger that this will also be the year where
Einstein’s famous equation sets out a chain of events that
leads to the destruction of civilization. This chain of
events will be triggered by the disregard of politicians
to the vastly different energy scales involved in nuclear
and chemical reactions[2], and the failure of scientists to
call this fact forcefully enough to theirs and the public’s
attention.
It is the responsibility of all humans, but especially
of physicists, to do their utmost to preserve Einstein’s
legacy and prevent developments that could lead sur-
vivors of a nuclear holocaust to remember Einstein as the
greatest criminal of all times. A set of confluent circum-
stances makes this particular moment more dangerous
than any other in the history of nuclear weapons. This
paper is a call to arms.
II. EINSTEIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
It took 14 years after Einstein’s discovery of E = mc2
for the world at large to discover Einstein. On the morn-
ing of November 7, 1919, newspapers all over the world
reported that Einstein’s prediction of gravitational de-
flection of light had just been verified in a solar eclipse,
making Einstein from then on a celebrity throughout the
civilized world.
It would only take 6 years after another action of Ein-
stein for the world to learn about its consequences. On
August 2nd, 1939, Einstein wrote a letter to US Pres-
ident Roosevelt to point out that the newly discovered
phenomenon of nuclear fission “would also lead to the
construction of bombs”, and urged Roosevelt to support
the work that would lead to nuclear bombs. The con-
certed work of many theoretical and applied physicists
in the ensuing years under the Manhattan project led to
the first controlled nuclear chain reaction in December
1942, and shortly thereafter to the first nuclear explosion
in July 1945. The world woke up on August 6, 1945,
to discover the horrors of a nuclear bomb used in an
act of war. The full extent of the devastation caused by
the nuclear explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would
only become clear several years later, as the long term
effects of the unleashed radioactivity were making their
way through the molecules, cells and tissue of the human
bodies that had been exposed.
Einstein himself was of course fully conscious of the
enormous responsibility on his shoulders, and in fact in
the years after his fateful letter to Roosevelt he opposed
the use of nuclear bombs in World War II. After the war,
he devoted large efforts to work for international coop-
eration and spoke out fervently in favor of nuclear dis-
armament. In Einstein’s own words: ”I believe America
may totally succumb to the fearful militarisation which
engulfed Germany at the beginning of the 20th century.”,
and ”In all countries power lies in the hands of ambi-
tious power-hungry men. This is true whether the politi-
cal system is dictatorial or democratic. Power relies not
only on coercion, but on subtle persuasion and deception
through the educational system and the media of public
information.” These words ring fully true today.
III. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The term ’weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s) is
used to describe chemical, biological, radiological and nu-
clear weapons. Here we will focus on chemical weapons
and nuclear weapons because they present the starkest
2contrast, and discuss what is the significance that they
are lumped into the common concept of WMD in the
formulation of policy.
Chemical weapons were first used on a wide scale
in World War I. Chlorine gas was first used by Ger-
many against French forces on April 1915, and by British
against German forces shortly thereafter[3]. Later, phos-
gene and mustard gas were used. Protection methods
against poison gases were however quickly developed, and
proved highly effective. The total number of deaths from
chemical weapons in WWI is estimated to be around
90,000[3], approximately 1% of the total number of ca-
sualties on the battlefield. Thus, 100-times more ’mass
destruction’ was caused by conventional weapons than by
chemical weapons in a conflict where chemical weapons
were used almost from the beginning. As scientists that
deal with objective reality we should object to the label
’weapon of mass destruction’ being applied to weapons
that cause 100 times fewer casualties than weapons of
non-mass-destruction, unless all weapons are made to fall
under such category.
The term ’weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s) has
become a central element in the formulation of United
States policy in recent years, especially since Iraq’s in-
vasion of Kuwait in 1990. The US invasion of Iraq in
March 2003 was launched with the stated purpose of rid-
ding Iraq of chemical and possibly biological weapons
that Iraq was known to possess before 1990. At the same
time the point was made that Iraq one day would pos-
sess nuclear weapons, which would heighten the dangers
more. This could appear to be a logical inference if there
was a logical link between different WMD’s, in particular
chemical and nuclear weapons. There is however no sci-
entific nor technological link between chemical weapons
and nuclear weapons, nor as discussed above is there any
relation between their destructive power that would not
also include conventional weapons. Consequently there
should not be a link in policy decisions or statements,
unless one accepts a premise that policy can be discon-
nected from reality. Scientists should be at the forefront
in exposing the flaw of such statements, but their voices
have not been heard.
IV. PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY
Chemical weapons involve chemical reactions, nuclear
weapons involve nuclear fission or fusion reactions. The
energy stored in the H-H chemical bond is of order 5eV ,
while the energy stored in a H atom through E = mc2
is of order 109 eV. Even though only a tiny fraction of
the mass of the atoms involved is released as energy in a
nuclear fission reaction, the fission reaction is over a mil-
lion times more powerful than the most potent chemical
reaction[2], and even higher for a fusion reaction.
The detailed processes by which chemical weapons and
nuclear weapons cause harm to human tissue and ulti-
mately death need not concern us here. The single scal-
ing factor of 1 million is all that matters to set the scale
of destruction achieved by these weapons, since destruc-
tion involves energy transfers. From this it follows that if
chemical weapons can kill 1000 humans, nuclear weapons
can kill 1 billion humans. Indeed existing nuclear arse-
nals can destruct humanity many times over.
In World War I, the initial use of chemical weapons
immediately led to retaliation by the other side with
more potent chemical weapons, and their use contin-
ued to escalate by both sides[3]. The cycle was stopped
not because human rationality prevailed, rather because
of technological reasons, namely that protection against
chemical weapons was quickly developed. We scientists
know for a fact that protection against large scale nuclear
weapons use cannot be developed.
The cycle of nuclear weapons use in World War II did
not escalate only because at that time only the United
States possessed nuclear weapons. That is no longer true
today. We know that human nature has not radically
changed since World War I, so that an escalating cycle of
nuclear attack and retaliation is likely to continue until
total destruction.
We scientists know these facts, the general population
is not as fully aware of them. It is our duty as well as
in our own interest to insert rationality in debates and
policy decisions on nuclear weapons. Our professional
organizations have not been vocal on these issues, that
needs to change.
V. PHYSICISTS’ RESPONSIBILITY
As physicists we bear a special responsibility, because a
physicist discovered E = mc2, because physicists discov-
ered nuclear fission and fusion reactions, because physi-
cists were the main actors in the Manhattan project, and
because of physicists deep involvement in the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons ever since. As physicists we
know better than other scientists and the general public
the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons, and
we have a responsibility to share that knowledge with
others.
Physicists that lived through the Manhattan project
years felt that responsibility deeply, and many prominent
physicists were active individually and through several
organizations such as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tist, Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, Pug-
wash, Federation of Atomic Scientists, contributing their
efforts to prevent nuclear arms buildup and related dan-
gerous policies.
However this is no longer happening to the same ex-
tent today. Even though many of these organizations
still exist, their structures have aged and many of their
founding members have retired. The younger genera-
tion of physicists has not felt the same call to become
involved in nuclear weapons policy issues, because the
reality of nuclear weapons use is not part of their per-
sonal experience. There have not been strong statements
3from the arms control organizations nor professional sci-
entific societies deploring the characterization of nuclear
and chemical weapons under the same label of ’WMD”.
We need to make a renewed effort to feel the urge that
the older generation felt to combat the potential destruc-
tive use of nuclear weapons, otherwise we may be en-
gulfed in events that once started will be impossible to
stop. In Einstein’s powerful words, ”In our time, scien-
tists and engineers carry a particularly heavy burden of
moral responsibility, because the development of military
means of mass destruction is dependent on their work.”
True, but let the chemists worry about chemical
weapons and biologists about biological weapons; physi-
cists should focus and continue taking the lead in wor-
rying about the nuclear weapons that their profession
created!
VI. CHAIN REACTIONS
Einstein’s 1905 paper set off a chain reaction that led
in a series of many steps to the nuclear arsenals of today.
Chain reaction is what leads in a nuclear device from
ignition where a few Uranium 235 atoms split to the full
explosion. Once a chain reaction is set into motion it
is very difficult or impossible to stop. That is why it is
essential to stop a chain reaction before it starts or at its
very early stages.
I do not see a point where the chain reaction that
led from 1905 to today could have been stopped. Once
E = mc2 was revealed, the discovery of fision and fu-
sion had to happen, and there has never been a time in
history where scientific progress has not been exploited
for military application. Even if WW2 had ended be-
fore Hiroshima, a nuclear device wold have been used in
a military action eventually to test its awesome power,
and humanity was fortunate that this hapened when only
one nation had achieved that technology. However I ar-
gue here that a specific imminent event will trigger a
chain reaction that will lead with very high probability
to the destruction of civilization: a new use of a nuclear
bomb by a nuclear nation against a non-nuclear one. I
furthermore argue that we are still at a point where this
chain of events can be stopped.
Some may argue that the point of no return has al-
ready been crossed, when the first nuclear weapons were
created or used, and that their large scale use is inevitable
in the long run. While impossible to prove wrong, this
may also be a self-fulfilling prophecy. After the horrors
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the world has relied on a uni-
versally agreed-upon taboo against the use of all nuclear
weapons, no matter how small, and on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nations have been encour-
aged to abandon nuclear weapons ambitions under the
promise of a general effort towards nuclear disarmament.
Once that taboo is broken the trend will be reversed,
and nations will race to acquire nuclear weapons for pro-
tection, deterrence and retaliation. Any regional conflict
will have a high potential to explode into all-out nuclear
war, with untold consequences.
VII. THE WAY TO STOP IT
There is no rational reason why nonnuclear nations
will choose to forego the development of nuclear weapons
technology if a nuclear nation today uses a nuclear bomb
against a non-nuclear adversary, other than the fear to
be attacked before it reaches the goal. Once a nation
acquires a few nuclear bombs, it possesses a powerful de-
terrent against nuclear attack even by a far superior ad-
versary: the fact that it can retaliate even with one hit.
Hence even if all nations had nuclear weapons today it
would be a relatively more stable situation. Of course the
probability that an unidentifiable terrorist group acquires
and uses a nuclear weapon increases, but nuclear nations
no matter how ’rogue’ have every incentive to avoid such
an event. If a nuclear nation nukes a non-nuclear na-
tion however, terrorist groups that are sympathetic to
the victim nation will have infinitely more incentive to
find a way to retaliate in the same kind, and eventually
will succeed.
It is also inconceivable that the United States and
other nuclear countries today will be able to stop the
182 non-nuclear nations from developing nuclear weapons
solely by provoking fear of military action. The NPT re-
lies on voluntary compliance by nations following a ra-
tional goal, and will become untenable if the goal is no
longer rational because it leaves the nation exposed to a
nuclear attack by the nuclear nations. Such reasoning is
likely to be used even by nations that today are friendly
to the United States and other nuclear nations.
Even in the current situation, the NPT is not providing
a strong incentive for non-proliferation, because nuclear
nations are dragging their feet in fulfilling their promises
of arms reduction. Instead, a much more stable equilib-
rium would be achieved if all nuclear nations pledged to-
day never to use a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear
adversary (by non-nuclear adversary it is meant an ad-
versary that does not possess nuclear weapons, even if
it is in full control of civilian nuclear technology). Simi-
lar proposals, such as ”no first use” pledge[4] have been
discussed in the past. The pledge discussed here is more
restricted than ’no first use’ since it would allow nuclear
nations to strike first at other nuclear nations.
It is difficult to imagine sequences of events where such
a pledge would leave a nuclear nation in a situation where
it would need to break the pledge for its survival or even
to gain significant advantages. If nuclear nations made
such a pledge and planned their military policy with the
intent of abiding by the pledge, they could make sure
that their other military resources allow them adequate
protection and even adequate offensive capability against
non-nuclear countries that possess any other weapon ca-
pability, including other ”WMD’s”. I realize that power-
ful nation may have geopolitical goals that would require
4use of military force in an offensive way[5]. However this
does not have to involve nuclear weapons.
Such a pledge by nuclear nations would provide a pow-
erful incentive for non-nuclear nations to not develop nu-
clear weapons, providing them with a powerful shield in
the form of the assurance that no nation would ever use
nuclear weapons against them. Instead, nuclear nations
would not enjoy such a privileged status, which in turn
would provide a strong incentive for nuclear nations with
small arsenals to voluntarily disarm. Non-nuclear nations
would become nuclear at their own risk.
By the same token, in the absence of such a pledge,
if military policy and planning of a nation relies on the
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries,
events will eventually lead that nation to a situation
where it will become essentially impossible not to use
a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear country. I argue
that we are almost at that point today.
VIII. THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
WEAPON POLICY
Nuclear weapons policy in the United States has
steadily evolved in recent years towards integration of
conventional and nuclear forces for military operations
in restricted theaters. The United States has never re-
nounced first use of nuclear weapons against conventional
forces, citing as example a Soviet invasion of Western Eu-
rope. However recent changes indicate that the United
States is now prepared to use nuclear weapons, even in
a pre-emptive way, against enemies that do not possess
nuclear weapons and do not represent a threat to the sur-
vival of the United States nor of any ally of the United
States.
The document ”Nuclear Posture Review”[6] from the
Department of Defense was delivered to Congress in De-
cember 2001 and represents official United States policy.
Not all of its contents have been made public, but the
ones that have reveal the essence of the new US nuclear
weapons policy. It envisages a ”new mix” of nuclear and
non-nuclear capabilities for a ”diverse set of potential ad-
versaries”, to provide ”flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear
and nuclear options”. For example, it states ”Composed
of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the
strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flex-
ibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to
defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabil-
ities may be particularly useful to limit collateral dam-
age and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be
employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear
attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-
weapon facilities).” Classified presidential directives spell
out further the policies contained in that document[7].
A draft document ”Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Opera-
tions” from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made
public and is available on the world wide web, one version
dated September 2003[8] and a revised one dated March
2005[7, 9]. This document is not yet official US policy but
it is reported that its adoption is imminent[10]. The doc-
ument describes in chilling detail scenarios under which
nuclear weapons will be used against non-nuclear nations.
Even if some changes are made before final adoption, be-
cause the document reflects the essentials of the policy
contained in ”Nuclear Posture Review” such changes will
only be cosmetic (there is no substantial difference be-
tween the 2003 and 2005 versions in the issues of concern
here). The scenarios described apply literally to events
about to unfold.
In the following I describe a series of events that will
lead with near certainty in the immediate future to imple-
mentation of this new nuclear policy and use of a nuclear
weapon against a non-nuclear nation: Iran.
IX. IRAN: THE IMMINENT DANGER
A tense situation has developed with Iran due to the
stated desire of Iran to implement the uranium enrich-
ment cycle for use in nuclear reactors. The US opposes
this due to stated fears that Iran would eventually divert
material to build nuclear weapons. It has put pressure on
European nations members of the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) to refer Iran to the UN Security
Council (SC) for the consideration of sanctions. Russia
and China have explicitly stated that they would veto
any SC resolution to impose sanctions on Iran, as they
consider Iran’s desire to be legitimate and allowed under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty of which Iran is sig-
natory. When the issue reaches the Security Council and
a sanctions resolution is vetoed, the US will be left with
no diplomatic options, only military ones.
The US has not engaged in direct negotiations with
Iran and other concerned nations to attempt to reach
a mutually acceptable agreement. The fact that it has
pushed for the IAEA resolution to refer Iran to the Secu-
rity Council on the face of explicit opposition by China
and Russia is puzzling, since such referral will not put
additional pressure on Iran, given the promised veto of
those two SC members. It ceases to be puzzling however
if a US decision to resort to a military option has al-
ready been made and the purpose of diplomacy is only to
provide cover for planned military action. US President
George Bush has explicitly refused to take the military
option off the table[11]. The only realistic military op-
tion for the US is aerial bombing of Iranian installations,
since a ground attack would likely be met with fierce Ira-
nian resistance that an overstretched US military would
not be able to overcome.
X. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TO COME
Assuming Iran is referred to the UN Security Council
and no sanctions are imposed, US military action appears
unavoidable. Such action is likely to include the use of
5low-yield nuclear weapons, for the reasons discussed in
what follows.
Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively) that re-
quires it to terminate production and eliminate stockpiles
over a period of years, however it is likely to still have
supplies[12–14]. Proof that Iran still posesses some chem-
ical weapons should not be difficult for the Bush admin-
istration to present, together with arguments that Iran
has used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war (conve-
niently omitting the fact that it was responding to chem-
ical attacks by Iraq) and that it could use them again
against US and British forces in Iraq. The Pentagon doc-
ument ”Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”[9] explic-
itly states that ”Geographic combatant commanders may
request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons
for a variety of purposes that include ”To demonstrate
US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter
adversary use of WMD”.
If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked
US attack on Iran, Iran is likely to retaliate with a bar-
rage of missiles against US and British forces in Iraq,
and possibly Israel, as well as possibly a ground inva-
sion of Iraq, that the 150,000 US troops in Iraq would
not be able to withstand. Iranian missiles could poten-
tially include chemical warheads, and it certainly would
be impossible to rule out such possibility. The Pentagon
document ”Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”[9] ex-
plicitly states that nuclear weapons may be used by the
US in the following situations: ”Against an adversary
using or intending to use WMD against US, multina-
tional or alliance forces or civilian populations”, ”To
counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional
forces including mobile and area target (troop concen-
tration)”, ”Attacks on adversary installations including
WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or bi-
ological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the
adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United
States or its friends and allies”, ”For rapid and favorable
war termination on US terms”, ”To ensure success of US
and multinational operations”. Each of these scenarios
applies literally to the Iran situation under discussion.
Early use by the US of low-yield nuclear bombs with
equal or better bunker-busting ability than conventional
bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile in-
stallations would be fully rational under the conditions
described above, and would have the added benefit of
sending a clear message to Iran that any response would
be answered by an immensely more devastating nuclear
attack. The US Senate is likely to have already approved
the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Per-
sian Gulf, given that Iran has missiles that it can equip
with chemical warheads at a moments notice. Such a
grave measure could be carried out without public disclo-
sure, with the argument that disclosing it would endanger
coalition troops in Iraq. Once military action starts the
US Senate and a large part of the American public are
likely to support the use of low yield nuclear weapons to
destroy Iranian installations, since this would protect the
lives of 150,000 US soldiers that would otherwise be at
great risk.
XI. SUMMARY
The points discussed in this paper have been separately
discussed by other authors in different contexts. Still I
believe that given the current situation it is of extreme
urgency to consider the totality of arguments given in
this paper, that lead either to a rational course of action
or an irrational one. I argue that never before, includ-
ing the Cuban missile crisis, have we been so close to
a point where a probable sequence of events about to
unfold would lead to the destruction of humanity. Un-
like the Cuban missile crisis, if this chain of events gets
started this time it is not likely to lead to total destruc-
tion in a matter of days or months; nevertheless we will
have entered a different world, and even if the time scale
of retaliation and escalation is years rather than days,
the chain reaction that will follow will be unstoppable.
Furthermore, this moment is far more dangerous than the
Cuban missile crisis because there is no immediate deter-
rent to the initial event that will get this chain reaction
started.
We have discussed in this paper the following points:
(i) Chemical weapons are qualitatively different from nu-
clear weapons. Nuclear weapons are in a class by them-
selves and it is extremely dangerous to lump them into
the same category with other so-called ’WMD’s”; (ii) A
country using a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear
country will start a chain of events that will lead unavoid-
ably to the destruction of civilization; (iii) Physicists have
a special responsibility to care about these issues and de-
vote effort to help the public understand them and to in-
fluence government policy; (iv) The situation with Iran is
extremely close to a point of no return, beyond which the
use of nuclear weapons will become unavoidable; (v) A
rational strategy does exist to create a substantially more
stable situation regarding nuclear weapons and provide a
real incentive for non-proliferation, that nuclear countries
pledge to under no circumstances use a nuclear weapon
against a non-nuclear adversary.
XII. A CALL TO ARMS
As argued above, physicists have an enormous re-
sponsibility on their shoulders as the creators of nu-
clear weapons. A petition by physicists opposing
pre-emptive nuclear strikes against non-nuclear coun-
tries is currently on the world wide web[15], URL
http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/. All physicists should
consider signing this petition.
In connection with the dangerous Iran situation, US
physicists should make their voices be heard urgently and
loudly, communicating with Congresspeople and lead-
6ing figures which can influence government policy, and
writing letters to local and national media demanding
full disclosure of government actions and plans regard-
ing the use of nuclear weapons, retraction of the policies
described in the documents ”Nuclear Posture Review”
and ”Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”, and stat-
ing vehemently their opposition to any course of action
that would lead to the necessity of using nuclear weapons
imminently against any non-nuclear nation and in partic-
ular Iran. European physicists should likewise attempt
to influence the upcoming actions of the ”European part-
ners” in the IAEA to avoid further escalation of the Iran
situation.
Assuming the Iran question is resolved in the next few
months without leading to nuclear war, physicists should
be at the forefront of a world-wide effort, that may ex-
tend over several years, to get humanity to demand that
all governments of nuclear countries pledge absolute re-
nunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear countries. Such pledge should be individually
made and incorporated in the law and the constitution
of each nuclear country, and it should not be put as con-
dition by any one country that all nuclear countries sub-
scribe to the pledge. However, nuclear countries that do
not sign the pledge would become pariahs in the world
community. Citizens of the world should actively boycott
all products and services of nuclear nations that have not
signed the pledge. It is likely that the United States will
be reluctant to sign, however even a country as power-
ful as the United States will feel the pressure of citizens
of all other countries as well as their own boycotting all
American-made products and services. Foregoing the en-
joyment of American productivity is a small price to pay
when the survival of humanity is at stake.
Let us all take some time out of our everyday scientific
activities to work towards ensuring that we and our de-
scendants will be around to enjoy the fruits of our labor,
relish the benefits that flowed from Einstein’s discovery
of E = mc2, and prevent that the world ever regrets that
E = mc2 was discovered.
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